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Abstract 
 
Most financial systems around the world have imposed new capital requirements for 
banks in the past years. This policy seems to be justified on two powerful economic 
grounds. First, better capitalized banks promote financial stability by reducing banks’ 
incentives to take risks and increasing banks’ buffers against losses. Second, lack of 
compliance with a set of rules established by the Basel Committee may harm confidence 
on a country´s financial system. While acknowledging these potential benefits, this paper 
makes the often overlooked point that the full implementation of Basel capital 
requirements may be socially undesirable for poorer countries seeking to develop their 
economies. On the one hand, higher capital requirements may reduce people´s access 
to finance, which can be particularly problematic in emerging countries with less 
developed capital markets and greater problems of financial exclusion. On the other 
hand, the one-size-fits-all model incentivized by the Basel Committee does not take into 
account many emerging countries’ social and economic markets, infrastructures and 
priorities. In our opinion, the presence and power of certain countries in the Basel 
Committee makes Basel recommendations partially biased toward those problems 
existing in these jurisdictions. Based on the aforementioned problems, this paper 
suggests some policy recommendations to promote a more resilient financial system 
without hampering financial inclusion and economic growth. 
 
Key words: capital requirements, Basel Accords, Basel III, Basel Committee, financial 
regulation, access to finance, tax benefits of debt, financial inclusion, economic growth. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Capital adequacy is one of the most important and indeed seminal aspects of 
international banking regulation. 3  Capital requirements promote the stability of the 
financial system by reducing banks’ incentives to take unwise risks and increasing 
banks’ buffers against losses.4  At the same time, however, capital requirements come 
with important, and at times underexplored, tradeoffs. Strict capital requirements may 
generate adverse effects on the real economy by slowing growth and people´s access to 
financial services. They might additionally slow the velocity of money in an economy, 
and with it the speed and extent to which it can be deployed.5  And, perhaps most 
overlooked, capital requirements shape indirectly who has access to capital, and on 
what terms. This distribution may not always be fair, or politically acceptable, for some 
countries and their leadership (and publics). As such, capital requirements pose unusual 
challenges for practitioners and stakeholders of international economic law. 
 
This article explores this ‘dark’ side of capital adequacy, and it provides some alternative 
solutions that may achieve some of the aspirations of traditional banking regulation –that 
is, better capitalized banks– at a lower financial, and indeed social, cost.  To do so, the 
article is organized as follows: Section 2 analyzes the origins, rationale and evolving role 
of the Basel standards, especially in the context of capital requirements. Section 3 
describes the unintended consequences of implementing high capital requirements and 
provides some empirical analysis of the costs generated by the implementation of Basel 
standards on capital adequacy. Section 4 discusses some policy recommendations to 
promote the stability of the financial system in a more efficient way than the costly rules 
imposed by the Basel Committee. Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
3 Douglas W. Diamond and Raghuram G. Rajan, A Theory of Bank Capital, 55 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 2431 
(2000); Hal S. Scott and Anna Gelpern, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 
(Foundation Press, 2012),  pp. 553-554; John Armour, Dan Awrey, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Jeffrey N. 
Gordon, Colin Mayer, and Jennifer Payne, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION (Oxford University Press, 
2016).  
4  See the report issued by the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision regarding Basel III: 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf. In the academic literature, see Douglas W. Diamond and Raghuram G. 
Rajan, A Theory of Bank Capital, 55 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 2431 (2000); Anat R. Admati, Peter M. DeMarzo, 
Martin F. Hellwig, and Paul Pfleidere, Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital 
Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Socially Expensive, PREPRINTS OF THE MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR 
RESEARCH ON COLLECTIVE GOODS BONN 2013/23 (2013), pp. 8-15.  
5 World Bank, Basel III and Banking Flows to Emerging Markets, WORLD BANK RESEARCH DIGEST Vol 6, 
Number 1 (2011). 
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2. The Rise of Capital Requirements  
 
2.1. The Origins and Rationale of Basel Capital Requirements  
  
Before moving to law and economics, a bit of history is in order. The Basel Committee, 
initially known as the Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices,  
was founded in 1974 by the central bank governors of the Group of Ten Countries.6 
Supervision of internationally active banks was the main focus of the Committee once 
founded. Nonetheless, capital adequacy soon became the main focus of the 
Committee's activities after Concordat was issued in 1975.7 In the early 1980s, the onset 
of the Latin American debt crisis8 heightened the Committee's concerns that the capital 
ratios of the main international banks were deteriorating at a time of growing 
international risks.9 This marked the entry of the Basel Committee into the arena of 
substantive rules regarding capital requirements.   
 
United Kingdom and United States regulators led the initiative to relate capital 
requirements to the riskiness of assets taking into account that banks are highly 
                                                 
6  History of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank of International Settlements. 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm (last visited Jan 12, 2019)  
7 One important aim of the Committee was to close gaps in international supervisory coverage so that (i) no 
banking establishment would escape supervision; and (ii) supervision would be adequate and consistent 
across member jurisdictions. The object of the Concordat was to set out certain guidelines for co-operation 
between national authorities in the  supervision of banks’ foreign establishments, and to suggest ways of 
improving its efficacy. In other words,  the Concordat provided the first version of  principles for sharing 
supervisory responsibility for banks' foreign branches, subsidiaries and joint ventures between host and 
parent (or home) supervisory authorities. Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices 
(1975), Report to the Governors on the supervision of banks’ foreign establishments (available at 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs00a.pdf)  
8 The Latin American debt crisis was a financial crisis that originated in the early 1980s, also known as "La 
Década Perdida", when Latin American countries reached a point where their foreign debt exceeded their 
earning power, and they were not able to repay it. As interest rates increased in the United States and in 
Europe in 1979, debt payments also increased, making it harder for borrowing countries to pay back their 
debts. Deterioration in the exchange rate with the US dollar meant that Latin American governments ended 
up owing tremendous quantities of their national currencies. The contraction of world trade in 1981 caused 
the prices of primary resources (Latin America's largest export) to fall. While the dangerous accumulation of 
foreign debt occurred over a number of years, the debt crisis began when the international capital markets 
became aware that Latin America would not be able to pay back its debt. The turning point occurred in 
August 1982 when Mexico announced that it would no longer be able to service its debt and requested a 
renegotiation of payment periods and new loans in order to fulfil its prior obligations. Because of this, most 
commercial banks reduced significantly or halted new lending to Latin America. As much of Latin America's 
loans were short-term, a crisis ensued when their refinancing was refused. The banks worldwide had to 
somehow restructure the debts to avoid financial panic. These restructurings usually involved new loans with 
very strict conditions, as well as the requirement that the debtor countries accept the intervention of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). See Manuel Pastor, Latin America, the Debt Crisis, and the International 
Monetary Fund, LATIN AMERICA'S DEBT AND THE WORLD ECONOMIC SYSTEM Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 79-110 (1989). 
9  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. History of the Basel Committee. Bank of International 
Settlements website: https://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm   
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leveraged by nature.10 Regulators of other jurisdictions joined the effort and in July 1988 
the Basel Committee proposed an 8 percent minimum capital ratio, which is calculated 
by dividing the Core Capital and Supplementary Capital11 by risk weighting of assets.12 
Backed by the G10 Governors, Committee members resolved to halt the erosion of 
capital standards in their banking systems and to work towards greater convergence in 
the measurement of capital adequacy. This resulted in a broad consensus on a weighted 
approach to the measurement of risk, both on and off banks' balance sheets.13 
 
In June 1999, the Committee issued a proposal for a new capital adequacy framework to 
replace the 1988 Accord. This led to the release of a revised capital framework in June 
2004. This new framework, generally known as "Basel II", comprised three pillars: (i) 
minimum capital requirements, which sought to develop and expand the standardised 
rules set out in the 1988 Accord; (ii) supervisory review of an institution's capital 
adequacy and internal assessment process; and (iii) effective use of disclosure as a 
lever to strengthen market discipline and encourage sound banking practices. 14 
However, just when countries were implementing Basel II, the financial global crisis 
started and some of the basis of Basel II were highly questioned.15  The banking sector 
entered the 2008 financial crisis with too much leverage and inadequate liquidity buffers. 
The boom of creative lending techniques which led the housing bubble, the proliferation 
                                                 
10 See Hal S. Scott and Anna Gelpern, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 
(Foundation Press, 2012), p. 540. 
11 Core capital corresponds to equity and disclosed reserves and Complementary capital includes  other 
instruments that can be accounted as capital at national discretion. Some examples of these instruments 
were: undisclosed reserves, general provisions and even subordinated debt instruments, sometimes with 
some limitations. For example, subordinated debt must not exceed 50% of Tier 1, and general provisions 
are limited to 1.25% of risk assets. Some items such as goodwill, investments in unconsolidated financial 
subsidiaries and holdings of other’s banks capital must be deducted from capital. See Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (1988), p. 4  
(available at: https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.pdf).  
12 As we mentioned, the idea behind the Basel Accord was to relate capital requirements to the riskiness of 
assets. The Committee considers that a weighted risk ratio in which capital is related to different categories 
of asset or off-balance-sheet exposure, weighted according to broad categories of relative riskiness, is the 
preferred method for assessing the capital adequacy of banks. The framework of weights has been kept as 
simple as possible and only five weights are used 0, 10, 20, 50 and 100%. The Basel Committee recognized 
there are inevitably some broad-brush judgements in deciding which weight should apply to different types 
of asset and the weightings should not be regarded as a substitute for commercial judgement for purposes 
of market pricing of the different instruments. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (1988), pp. 8-13 (available at 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.pdf). 
13  See Bank of International Settlements. History of the Basel Committee. (2018) (available at 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm)  
14 See Bank of International Settlements, Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and 
Capital Standards: A Revised Framework (available at https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.htm) 
15 Basel II relies on credit rating agencies –which were highly criticized during the financial crisis for the 
rating of credit default swaps and its conflicts of interest– for the measurement of credit risk that impact how 
much capital a bank needs. 
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of off exchange-traded derivatives and the use of off-balance-sheet entities, played an 
important role during the crisis. The combination of OTC derivatives, risk-based capital 
requirements with the gaps of Basel I16 and Basel II and favourable accounting rules, 
enabled Wall Street to create an assembly line for purchasing, packaging and selling 
unregistered securities, such as subprime collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), to a 
wide variety of institutional investors. 17 These weaknesses were accompanied by poor 
governance and risk management, as well as inappropriate incentive structures. The 
dangerous combination of these factors was demonstrated by the mispricing of credit 
and liquidity risks, and excess credit growth. 
 
Responding to these risk factors, the Basel Committee issued Principles for Sound 
Liquidity Risk Management18 and Supervision in the same month that Lehman Brothers 
failed. In July 2009, the Committee issued a further package of documents to strengthen 
the Basel II capital framework, notably with regard to the treatment of certain complex 
securitization positions, off-balance sheet vehicles and trading book exposures.19 These 
enhancements were part of a broader effort to strengthen the regulation and supervision 
of internationally active banks in the light of weaknesses revealed by the financial market 
crisis. 
 
In September 2010, the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision announced 
higher global minimum capital standards for commercial banks. 20  This followed an 
agreement reached in July regarding the overall design of the capital and liquidity reform 
package, now referred to as "Basel III". 21  In November 2010, the new capital and 
                                                 
16 Basel I included as capital instruments such as subordinated debt and the framework of weights for asset 
risk measurement was too simple for the complexity of assets of the financial services industry in the years 
before the global financial crisis.  
17 See Richard Christopher Whalen, The Subprime Crisis: Cause, Effect and Consequences, NETWORKS 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTE POLICY BRIEF NO. 04 (2008) (Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1113888).   
18 The final document is available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm  
19 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. History of the Basel Committee. Bank of International 
Settlements website: https://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm   
20 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision announces 
higher global minimum capital standards. Press Release (2010) (available at 
https://www.bis.org/press/p100912.htm)  
21 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Results of the December 2010 meeting of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision. Press release (2010) (available at 
https://www.bis.org/press/p101201a.htm)  
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liquidity standards were endorsed at the G20 Leaders' Summit in Seoul and 
subsequently agreed at the December 2010 Basel Committee meeting.22 
 
The proposed standards were issued by the Committee in mid-December 2010 (and 
have been subsequently revised). The December 2010 versions were set out in Basel 
III: International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring and 
Basel III.23  The tightened definitions of capital, significantly higher minimum ratios and 
the introduction of a macroprudential overlay represent a fundamental overhaul for 
banking regulation. At the same time, the Basel Committee, its governing body and the 
G20 leaders emphasized that the reforms would be introduced in a way that does not 
impede the recovery of the real economy.24  
 
In addition, time was needed to translate the new internationally agreed standards into 
national legislation. To reflect these concerns, a set of transitional arrangements for the 
new standards was announced in September 2010, although national authorities were 
free to impose higher standards and shorten transition periods where appropriate.25 
Capital regulations such as new definitions and categories of capital and capital 
conservation buffer were fully implemented by member jurisdictions of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision by the end of 2016.26 Nonetheless, some risk-based 
                                                 
22 The Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, who was the President of the Netherlands 
Bank, described the Basel III Framework as "a landmark achievement that will help protect financial stability 
and promote sustainable economic growth. The higher levels of capital, combined with a global liquidity 
framework, will significantly reduce the probability and severity of banking crises in the future." He added 
that "with these reforms, the Basel Committee has delivered on the banking reform agenda for 
internationally active banks set out by the G20 Leaders at their Pittsburgh summit in September 2009". The 
press release is available at http://www.bis.org/press/p101216.htm 
23  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Basel III: International framework for liquidity risk 
measurement, standards and monitoring (available at https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs188.htm) 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks 
and banking systems (available at https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189_dec2010.htm)  
24 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Basel III Rules text and results of the quantitative impact study 
issued by the Basel Committee. Press Release. (2016).  
25 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. History of the Basel Committee. Bank of International 
Settlements website: https://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm   
26 Capital instruments that no longer qualify as Common Equity Tier 1 capital or Tier 2 capital were already 
implemented by all member jurisdictions by 2016. Turning to the minimum capital requirements, the higher 
minimums for Common Equity and Tier 1 capital were phased in from 2013, and became effective at the 
beginning of 2015. The minimum common equity and Tier 1 requirements increased from 2% and 4% to 
3.5% and 4.5%, respectively, at the beginning of 2013. The minimum common equity and Tier 1 
requirements rose to 4% and 5.5%, respectively, at the beginning of 2014. The final requirements for 
common equity and Tier 1 capital were set at 4.5% and 6%, respectively, at the beginning of 2015. The 
2.5% capital conservation buffer, comprises common equity and is in addition to the 4.5% minimum 
requirement.  
See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Fourteenth progress report on adoption of the Basel 
regulatory framework (2018) (available at https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d440.pdf).  
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capital standard,27 aspects of the Basel III leverage ratio,28 requirements for liquidity,29 
requirements for systemically important banks 30  and the revisions to the regulatory 
framework for risk weighted assets31 are still being implemented.  
 
Last, on December 2017 the Committee’s Basel III reforms complemented the initial 
phase of the Basel III post-crisis standards that started being discussed in 2010.32 The 
2017 reforms sought to restore credibility in the calculation of risk-weighted assets33 and 
improve the comparability of banks’ capital ratios. While the first phase of Basel III 
focused largely on the capital side of the capital ratio calculation (the numerator), the 
2017 reforms concentrated on the denominator.34 The implementation timeline for these 
reforms starts in January 2022 and ends in January 2027.35 
 
2.2. The Evolving Role of the Basel standards  
 
                                                 
27 Countercyclical buffer, margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives, capital requirements for 
bank exposures to central counterparties, capital requirements for investment funds, the Total Loss-
absorbing capacity requirement and the securitization framework published in December 2014. 
28 In December 2017, the Basel Committee issued the revised leverage ratio framework, which will become 
into effect on 1 January 2022.  
29 Such as monitoring tools for intraday management and the Net Stable Funding Ratio.  
30  Such as the leverage ratio buffer for Global Systemically Important Banks, the Global Systemically 
Important Banks Framework, Domestic Systemically Important Banks framework,. 
31 In December 2017, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published the finalised Basel III post-
crisis reforms, which will take effect  from January 2022 and include the following aspects: revised 
standardized approach for credit risk, revised internal ratings-based (IRB) approach for credit risk, revised 
credit valuation adjustment (CVA) framework, revised minimum capital requirements for market risk, revised 
operational risk framework and an output floor based on the revised Basel III standardized approaches.  
32  Some called this last post-crisis document of standards “Basel IV”. For example, see 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Basel IV. The next generation  of RWA (available at 
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/services/advisory/basel-iv.html (last visited January 13, 2019); Deutsche Bank, 
What is Basel IV (available at https://www.db.com/newsroom_news/2018/what-is-basel-iv-en-11456.htm) 
(last visited January 13, 2019); McKinsey & Company, Bringing Basel IV into focus (available at 
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/risk/our-insights/bringing-basel-iv-into-focus) (last visited 
January 13, 2019)  
33 Risk-weighted assets are an estimate of risk that determines the minimum level of regulatory capital a 
bank must maintain to deal with unexpected losses. A prudent and credible calculation of risk-weighted 
assets is an integral element of the risk-based capital framework. 
34 Most banks around the world use the standardised approach (SA) for credit risk. Under this approach, 
supervisors set the risk weights that banks apply to their exposures to determine risk-weighted assets 
(RWA). This means that banks do not use their internal models to calculate RWA. The main changes to the 
SA for credit risk are expected to reduce reliance on external credit ratings and to require banks to conduct 
sufficient due diligence when using external ratings. Additionally, 2017 reform introduced some constraints 
to banks’ estimates of risk parameters and limitations for banks using internal-ratings based approach. The 
reforms also contain some changes regarding operational risk,  a leverage ratio buffer for G-SIBs and a risk-
sensitive output floor that limits the amount of capital benefit a bank can obtain from its use of internal 
models, relative to using the standardised approaches.  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
Basel III: Finalising Post-crisis Reforms (2017) (available at https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.pdf).  
35 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: Finalising Post-crisis Reforms (2017) (available 
at https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.pdf).  
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2.2.1. The growing scope of Basel capital requirements  
 
Capital requirements have evolved with regards to different aspects, including the type 
of banks and the number of jurisdictions complying with the Basel standards, as well as 
its legally binding effects. This section will focus on defining the scope of this expansion 
in the implementation of Basel capital requirements before moving to the understanding 
of the reasons behind this growing scope, discussed in section 2.2.2. 
 
2.2.1.1. Types of Institutions subject to this new regulatory framework 
 
Basel capital requirements were created to prevent systemic risk exacerbated by banks 
that operate across national borders. Supervision of internationally active banks was the 
main focus of the Committee from its creation. According to the Basel I Accord, the 
agreed framework was designed to establish minimum levels of capital for internationally 
active banks and national authorities were free to adopt arrangements that set higher 
levels.36  Additionally, under Basel Committee’s Charter, members agreed to implement 
fully Basel standards for their internationally active banks.37  
 
This evolved over time and when Basel II was published in 2004, the document 
mentioned not only internationally active banks, but also “banks with significant risk 
exposures”38 , and “other significant banks and their significant bank subsidiaries”39 . 
Basel II implementation was atypical and caused a split between the United States and 
Europe. While the first implemented Basel slowly, partially and only for its most 
sophisticated banks, Europe implemented it for all banks.40  
 
In Basel III, the international activity of banks did not seem to be the main focus of the 
Committee. Internationally active banks were mentioned only to clarify some of the 
standards but not as the main targets of the rules. For example, when explaining the 
                                                 
36 See See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. International Convergence of Capital Measurement 
and capital standards (1988), p. 2 (available at https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.pdf).  
37 See Section V, num. 12 of Basel Committee’s Charter (available at https://www.bis.org/bcbs/charter.htm)  
38 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence  of Capital Measurement and 
Capital Standards. A Revised Framework (2004), p. 149 (available at https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf).  
39 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence  of Capital Measurement and 
Capital Standards. A Revised Framework (2004), p. 189 (available at https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf)  
40  Hal S. Scott and Anna Gelpern, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 
(Foundation Press, 2012),  p. 538. 
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countercyclical buffer, Basel III clarifies that for internationally active banks it will be a 
weighted average of the buffers deployed across all the jurisdictions to which it has 
credit exposures which might means that this type of banks will likely find themselves 
subject to a small buffer on a more frequent basis, since credit cycles are not always 
highly correlated across jurisdictions.41 The discussions related to whether Basel should 
apply to all size of banks are now taking place in some jurisdictions due to the studies 
that have measured the impact of post-crisis regulatory burden and its unintended 
consequences.42  
 
2.2.1.2. Geographical scope of Basel capital requirements 
 
Basel standards framework rapidly went beyond those jurisdictions belonging to the 
Basel Committee. For a variety of reasons discussed in section 2.2.2, there was an 
expansion in the number of jurisdictions applying Basel capital requirements. Under the 
Basel Committee’s Charter, only internationally active banks should fully implement 
Basel standards. Nevertheless, these standards constitute minimum requirements and 
BCBS members may decide to go beyond them. In September 1993, the Basel 
Committee issued a statement confirming that G10 countries' banks with material 
international banking business were meeting the minimum requirements set out in the 
                                                 
41 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient 
banks and banking systems (2010), p, 65 (available at https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189_dec2010.pdf).  
42 The Congress of United States eased the burden on banks with $50 billion and $100 billion in assets from 
compliance with some of the more stringent parts of the Dodd-Frank reforms, with the purpose to promote 
economic growth. Additionally, this legislative initiative established that financial regulatory agencies may 
evaluate which burdens could be unnecessarily affecting economic growth every 10 years. As a result, the 
Federal Reserve published a proposal that prescribes materially less stringent requirements on small firms.  
The lowest rung would entail banks with between $100 billion and $250 billion in assets. They would be 
subject to significantly reduced requirements including exclusion from stress tests the Fed conducts to see 
how banks would hold up in the face of another financial crisis. See Randal K. Quarles (Vice Chairman for 
Supervision), Implementation of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2018) (available at 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/quarles20181002a.htm).  
In Germany, some authors recommended a small banking box approach, which is an entirely new and more 
radical way to reinforce proportionality: a specific, independent set of rules for smaller institutions. The idea 
behind this proposal is counting with a set of rules that makes demands on small banks without placing an 
unnecessary burden on them and impacting negatively the expansion of lending. See Andreas Dombret, 
Heading towards a "small banking box" – which business model needs what kind of regulation? Presentation 
at the Bavarian Saving Banks Conference (2017) (available at: 
http://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Reden/2017/2017_06_29_dombret.html).  
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Accord43 and just before Basel II was published in 2004, banks from 120 countries had 
adopted the Basel I rules.44  
 
Regarding Basel III, capital requirements have been implemented in all member 
jurisdictions45 and jurisdictions that are not members of the Basel Committee also report 
substantial progress in adopting these standards. The Financial Stability Institute 
publishes a regular overview of that progress showing that a significant number of these 
jurisdictions have already brought key elements of Basel III into force or are in the 
process of doing so –many of which have closely followed the Basel Committee agreed 
implementation dates. According to the Financial Stability Institute, in 2012, only six non-
Basel Committee countries had adopted final rules relating to the new definition of 
regulatory capital. This number increased to 44 in 2014 and exceeded 60 by the end of 
2016. By 2018, around 70 non-Basel Committee member jurisdictions had issued final 
rules on these elements of the Basel III framework.46  
 
2.2.1.3. The binding effects of Basel capital requirements 
 
The binding effects of capital requirements have also changed over time, expanding the 
scope of capital requirements. International financial regulation, in which Basel Capital 
Requirements are certainly included, does not share the same issuance procedures and 
enforcement as international public law. The commitments by members of the 
Committee are not imposed in treaties.47 In this context, Basel capital requirements were 
not rules directly imposed to countries or financial institutions. They were just 
recommendations, and therefore a type of soft law that turn into mandatory. These 
requirements were not formally binding to all financial systems and institutions when 
they were issued by the Basel Committee. International financial regulation is 
                                                 
43 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. History of the Basel Committee. Bank of International 
Settlements website: https://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm   
44 See Hal S. Scott and Anna Gelpern, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 
(Foundation Press, 2012), p. 542. 
45 The Basel Committee comprises 45 members from 28 jurisdictions, consisting of central banks and 
authorities with formal responsibility for the supervision of banking business.  
46 William Coen (Secretary General of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision), Global adoption of the 
Basel framework: enhancing financial stability across countries, Speech 9th Islamic Financial Services 
Board Public Lecture on Financial Policy and Stability (2017) (available at 
https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp170405.pdf).  
47 Some authors include these instruments under the category of “soft law” since they do not impose formal 
legal obligations for the member jurisdictions. See Chris Brummer, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM: RULE MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Cambridge University Press, 2015),  p. 120. 
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encouraged by various disciplining mechanisms that render it, under certain 
circumstances, more coercive than traditional theories of “soft law” making it 
mandatory.  International financial regulation, defies a number of common, and indeed 
foundational, assumptions regarding the operation and compliance pull of informal legal 
obligations. The complex operations of the international financial system challenge 
traditional academic frameworks that classify obligations into hard and soft law.  
 
Whatever their character as hard or soft, this standards need to be analyzed and 
understood against their institutional backdrops and disciplining mechanisms which 
make them, in practice, mandatory. 48 Although its compliance is not enforceable through 
sanctions, other mechanisms exist in international financial regulation to incentivize and, 
somehow make mandatory, the implementation of Basel standards even for non-
member jurisdictions of the Basel Committee. For example, complying with capital 
requirements even beyond the minimum required, is perceived as less risky or, in other 
words, more solvent. Also, significant evidence is available that banks often keep higher 
amounts of capital on their books than is formally required under their national 
regulations. 49 
 
2.2.2. Understanding the reasons behind the growing scope of Basel standards  
 
The expansion of the scope of Basel-based capital requirements, especially to emerging 
markets and developing countries, can be explained by two primary reasons. Frist, 
international surveillance programs and financial assistance provided by international 
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank forced many 
countries to comply with Basel capital requirements in order to be able to receive 
financial assistance. Second, market forces and reputational concerns also served as a 
powerful mechanism to embrace the adoption of Basel capital requirements by countries 
and institutions beyond those initially included in the scope of the Basel standards.  
 
                                                 
48 See Chris Brummer, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
(Cambridge University Press, 2015),  pp. 120-127 and 179-181.  
49 See Chris Brummer, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
(Cambridge University Press, 2015),  p. 149. 
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2.2.2.1. International Surveillance Programs and Financial Assistance 
 
The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Financial Stability Board –
initially known as the Financial Stability Forum– have played integral roles in the 
adoption of the Basel standards.50 The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union in 1991 enabled the IMF to become a nearly universal institution. In 
three years, membership increased from 152 countries to 172.51 However, by then the 
involvement of the IMF and the World Bank was mostly related to the promotion of a 
stable system of exchange rates and macroeconomic aspects rather than financial 
market regulation matters.52 This surveillance involved matters such as foreign direct 
investment, government spending and transparency, exchange rate controls and similar 
economic aspects, but not issues related to how countries were implementing financial 
regulation reforms with regards to banks’ performance and capital requirements.  
 
Later, the Asian financial crisis in 1990s53 marked a relevant change in this surveillance 
performed by IMF and World Bank. As a result of this and the intervention of the IMF 
and World Bank in it, many countries were forced to implement major reforms in their 
                                                 
50 See Hal S. Scott and Anna Gelpern, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 
(Foundation Press, 2012),  p. 542; Chris Brummer, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE 
MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Cambridge University Press, 2015),  p. 120. 
51 See International Monetary Fund, Societal Change for Eastern Europe and Asian Upheaval (1990-2004) 
Available at: https://www.imf.org/external/about/histcomm.htm (Last visited January 13, 2019). 
52 Article IV of International Monetary Fund’s Articles of Agreement required that each member collaborate 
with the IMF and other members via surveillance to assure orderly exchange arrangements and to promote 
a stable system of exchange rates. See Chris Brummer, MINILATERALISM: HOW TRADE ALLIANCES, SOFT LAW 
AND FINANCIAL ENGINEERING ARE REDEFINING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT (Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 
102-103. 
53 The Asian financial crisis was a period of financial crisis that affected mostly East Asia beginning in July 
1997 and raised fears of a worldwide economic meltdown due to financial contagion. The crisis started in 
Thailand with the financial collapse of the Thai baht –Thai currency– after the Thai government was forced 
to float the baht due to lack of foreign currency to support its currency peg to the U.S. dollar. At the time, 
Thailand had acquired a burden of foreign debt that made the country effectively bankrupt even before the 
collapse of its currency. Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand were the countries most affected by the 
crisis. Hong Kong, Laos, Malaysia and the Philippines were also hurt by the slump. Brunei, China, 
Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam were less affected, although all suffered from a loss of demand and 
confidence throughout the region. Japan was also affected, though less significantly. The IMF created a 
series of rescue packages for the most-affected economies to enable affected nations to avoid default, tying 
the packages to currency, banking and financial system reforms. The IMF's support was conditional on a 
series of economic reforms, the "structural adjustment package" (SAP). The SAPs called on affected nations 
to reduce government spending and deficits, allow insolvent banks and financial institutions to fail, and 
aggressively raise interest rates. See Masahiro Kawai and Peter J. Morgan, Central Banking for Financial 
Stability in Asia, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK INSTITUTE, ADBI WORKING PAPER SERIES 377 (2012) (available at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20121018154416/http://www.adbi.org/files/2012.08.28.wp377.central.banking.fi
nancial.stability.asia.pdf); Stanley Fischer, The IMF and the Asian Crisis - Address by Stanley Fischer 
(1998) (available at https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sp032098); Sam Ho, History 
Lesson: Asian Financial Crisis. Reasons for the Asian Financial Crisis (2011) (available at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20151117133309/http://spyonstocks.com/history-lesson-asian-financial-crisis/)  
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financial sector as a condition to obtain financing from the IMF.54 However, this brought 
consequences for many countries, not only the ones involved in the Asian financial 
crisis. International policy makers or groups of financial regulators55 started to promote 
better practices and standards in order to prevent  capital market crises that could 
severely affect the stability of the global financial system and exchange rates. 
Additionally, G-7 leaders pressed for increased surveillance activities directed toward 
capital market management and in 1998 the Financial Stability Forum –today, the 
Financial Stability Board– was in charge of identifying the internationally accepted 
prudential standards that could prevent global financial crisis in the future. 56  These 
standards became later the basis for the global surveillance system led by the IMF and 
World Bank, called Financial Sector Assessment Program,57 in which the Reports on 
Observance of Standards and Codes58 include the Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision59 issued by the Basel Committee.  
                                                 
54 This is when the scope of surveillance was extended beyond monetary and policy affairs. National and 
international regulatory authorities concluded that capital markets performance could have important 
implications or the financial stability. See Chris Brummer, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE 
MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Cambridge University Press, 2015),  p. 94. 
55  For example, the International Organization of Securities Commissions or the Basel Committee for 
Banking Supervision.  
56 The Forum was founded in 1999 to promote international financial stability. Its founding resulted from 
discussions among Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the G7 countries. The FSF 
membership included about a dozen nations who participate through their central banks, financial ministries 
and departments, and securities regulators, including: the United States, Japan, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands and several other industrialized economies as 
well as several international economic organizations. At the G20 summit on November, 2008, it was agreed 
that the membership of the FSF will be expanded to include emerging economies, such as China. The 2009 
G-20 London summit decided to establish a successor to the FSF, the Financial Stability Board. The FSB 
includes members of the G20 who were not members of FSF. See Financial Stability Board, Our history 
(2018). Available at: http://www.fsb.org/history/ (Last visited 14 January 2019) 
57 The Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) was established in 1999. It is a comprehensive and in-
depth assessment of a country’s financial sector. The FSAP analyzes the resilience of the financial sector, 
the quality of the regulatory and supervisory framework, and the capacity to manage and resolve financial 
crises. Based on its findings, FSAPs produce recommendations of a micro- and macro-prudential nature for 
the evaluated country to implement. See International Monetary Fund. Financial Sector Assessment 
Program (FSAP) (2018). Available at: https://www.imf.org/external/np/fsap/fssa.aspx (Last visited 13 
January 2019).  
58 The Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) initiative was launched in 1999 as a 
prominent component of efforts to strengthen the international financial architecture. The initiative aims at 
promoting greater financial stability, both domestically and internationally, through the development, 
dissemination, adoption, and implementation of international standards and codes. The ROSC initiative have 
recognized international standards in 12 policy areas. The  12 policy areas fall under one of three broader 
groups - policy transparency, financial sector regulation and supervision, and market infrastructure. See 
World Bank, Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (2018). Available at: 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/rosc (Last visited 11 January 2019).  
59 The Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision are the de facto minimum standard for sound 
prudential regulation and supervision of banks and banking systems. Originally issued by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision. In 1997, they are used by countries as a benchmark for assessing the 
quality of their supervisory systems and for identifying future work to achieve a baseline level of sound 
supervisory practices. The Core Principles were revised in 2006 and 2012. See Basel Committee on 
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According to Principle 16 of the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, 
financial supervisors should set prudent and appropriate capital adequacy requirements 
for banks that reflect the risks undertaken by a financial institution in the context of the 
markets and macroeconomic conditions in which it operates. The Core Principles add 
that supervisors shall define the components of capital, bearing in mind their ability to 
absorb losses, and at least for internationally active banks, capital requirements shall not 
be less than the applicable Basel standards.60Additionally, Basel Committee does not 
consider implementation of the Basel-based framework a pre-requisite for compliance 
with the Core Principles, and the FSAP should be tailored to country-specific 
circumstances 61 . Yet, FSAPs grade Basel capital requirements compliance for the 
jurisdictions evaluated. In fact, FSAPs are incorporated into IMF and World Bank aid 
programs, which ties the adoption of international regulatory practices such as Basel 
capital requirements, to the conditions of the World Banks and IMF’s loans making these 
standards mandatory.    
 
For example, Peru is not a member of the Basel Committee.62 Nonetheless, this country 
is evaluated under the FSAP undertaking a full graded Basel Core Principles  
assessment of the essential criteria, as compliant, non-compliant or materially non-
compliant. According to this report evaluation, “the Superintendence of Banks, Insurers 
and Private Pension Funds has made significant progress on the implementation of the 
Basel III regulatory reform agenda.” 63 Additionally, the assessment shows a comparison 
between what Peruvian regulators require regarding capital adequacy and Basel III 
standards. The differences between Basel recommendations and Peruvian regulations 
                                                                                                                                                 
Banking Supervision. Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (2012) (available at 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.pdf).  
60 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (2012), 
pp. 44-46 (available at: https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.pdf). 
61 See International Monetary Fund. Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) (2018). Available at: 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/fsap/fssa.aspx (Last visited 13 January 2019). 
62  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Basel Committee Membership (2018). Available at: 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/membership.htm (Last visited 13 January 2019).  
63 See International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, Peru: Financial Sector 
Assessment Program-Detailed Assessment of Observance - Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision, IMF STAFF COUNTRY REPORTS (2018), pp.  37 (available at 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2018/12/14/Peru-Financial-Sector-Assessment-Program-
Detailed-Assessment-of-Observance-Basel-Core-46474).  
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are highlighted in the report, but the implemented approaches aim to achieve the same 
objectives as Basel III and, according to the FSAP, “broadly equivalent”.64  
 
Another example is the Russian FSAP report, issued in 2016 by the IMF, in which it is 
highlighted that the Russian framework for capital adequacy has been periodically 
updated to include Basel III standards and was further amended by a series of reforms, 
most of which became effective in January 2016. The report states that “there are a few 
deviations from the Basel capital calculation that are in fact being eliminated according 
to the CBR [Central Bank of the Russian Federation/ Bank of Russia], starting on 
January 1, 2016.”65 
 
2.2.2.2. Market pressures and reputational concerns  
 
Market pressures and reputational concerns also pushed regulators and banks  to adopt 
Basel standards. This seems to be justified on several grounds. First, many countries 
may have been motivated to follow the world´s most important economies (all of them 
represented in the Basel Committee). Countries may have incentives to replicate their 
financial regulatory framework not only as a way to show how sound their financial 
system is but also to be perceived  in the market as compliant with a reputable institution 
such as the Basel Committee.66 Regardless of the country´s financial problems and 
                                                 
64 See International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, Peru: Financial Sector 
Assessment Program-Detailed Assessment of Observance - Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision, IMF STAFF COUNTRY REPORTS (2018), pp.  37 (available at 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2018/12/14/Peru-Financial-Sector-Assessment-Program-
Detailed-Assessment-of-Observance-Basel-Core-46474). 
65  See International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Capital Markets Department, Russian Federation 
Financial Sector Assessment Program Detailed Assessment of Observance Basel Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision (2016), pp. 148 (available at 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2016/12/31/Russian-Federation-Financial-Sector-
Assessment-Program-Detailed-Assessment-of-Observance-44285).  
66 In most cases, implementing the Basel standards does not require legislative approval. Central banks and 
regulatory agencies are often the ones in charge of prudential regulations. This facilitates the 
implementation of Basel Committee’s recommendations in many jurisdictions from a procedural point of 
view, since not legislative track must be followed. Nonetheless, this is not the case of all jurisdictions. For 
example, Chilean financial regulation requires the legislative to adopt the prudential requirements in a law, 
which makes more difficult to this jurisdiction to implement Basel standards. The legislative agenda usually 
has other priorities in the top of the list, specially taken into account that Chilean banks were not highly 
affected by the global financial crisis. See Enrique Marshall, En deuda con Basilea III, DIARIO FINANCIERO 
(2018) (available at https://www.df.cl/noticias/opinion/columnistas/en-deuda-con-basilea-iii/2018-09-
20/195235.html). 
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priorities, which we will explain further in section 3.1, many jurisdictions might be 
indirectly forced to adopt these new capital requirements.67  
 
Second, currently the number of banks that interact in international markets is higher 
than when the Basel Committee was founded. The number of international banks in the 
globalized world has increased, as well as the complexity of financial conglomerates. In 
1995, around 20% of the banks were international banks. In 2013, almost 40% of the 
banks worldwide were international banks, despite the fact that the number of 
international banks decreased in 2008 and 2009 as a result of the global financial 
crisis. 68  The more active the bank is internationally, it will be more incentivized to 
implement Basel standards. Due to the reputation of the Basel Committee, many market 
participants (including lenders, investors and credit rating agencies) may appreciate, and 
even encourage, Basel standards implementation. After all, these rules are enacted by a 
group of developed countries theoretically equipped with many experts to provide advice 
on how to design a better financial system. For example, investors in financial 
institutions with low capital ratios  generally require a bank issuer to accept lower prices 
or higher return rates for their securities to reflect the increased risk associated with their 
investment. 69  These market discipline mechanisms are particularly important in the 
context of capital adequacy requirements because to capitalize a bank at a reasonable 
cost, the bank needs to appear attractive to investors in international financial markets, 
                                                 
67 For example, in Colombia the conversations around the implementation of Basel III started to take place in 
2011. Although, Colombia is not a member of the Basel Committee and Colombian banks were not affected 
by the global financial crisis, this jurisdiction started the implementation of Basel III capital requirements in 
2012 but at the same time financial inclusion was a priority for the government. See Sergio Clavjio, Informe 
de Inclusion Financiera (2012) (available at https://bancadelasoportunidades.gov.co/sites/default/files/2017-
03/Reporte_inclusion_2012_0.pdf)  
Another example is Mexico, the discussion about Basel III post-crisis capital requirements started in 2012. In 
this context, some market participants argued that expansion of lending was a priority and more important 
than the implementation of Basel capital requirements. See Isabel Mayioral Jimenez, Mexico aplicará 
Basilea III, le duela a quien le duela, EXPANSION (2012) (available at: 
https://expansion.mx/economia/2012/03/02/basilea-3-sin-marcha-atras-cnbv)  
68  José María Álvarez, Javier Pablo García, and Olga Gouveia, Globalización bancaria: ¿Cómo está 
impactando la regulación en los bancos globales?, OBSERVATORIO GLOBAL BBVA RESEARCH (2016), pp. 20 
(available at https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Globalizacion_bancaria.pdf).  
69  These market disciplines can operate regardless of whether or not a regulator has committed to a 
particular regulatory standard. See Chris Brummer, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE 
MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Cambridge University Press, 2015),  p. 150. 
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usually. 70  In some jurisdictions, this need seems to have pushed some banks 
themselves to ask their regulators to implement Basel reforms.71 
 
Third, the costs of comparing financial systems and institutions will be lower if 
international practices are standardized. Indeed, since standardization saves resources 
associated with gathering and analyzing information, countries and institutions may have 
incentives to adopt internationally accepted standards. Even if they convincingly explain 
why they are not complying with international standards, this explanation would be more 
costly to process by third parties. Moreover, credit agencies also tend to be a source of 
information for domestic financial regulators with regards of how peer jurisdictions are 
complying with Basel standards. 72  As a result of the higher costs associated with 
explaining why a country might not need to adopt these international standards, and 
therefore the market punishment associated with this lack of compliance, countries and 
institutions will reasonably have incentives to comply with Basel standards.  
 
3. Unintended consequences of implementing Basel Capital Requirements 
 
3.1. Overview  
 
While the imposition of higher capital requirements for banks may promote a more 
resilient global financial system,73 the Basel Committee does not seem to have carefully 
                                                 
70 Banks incorporated in jurisdictions were capital markets are not sufficiently developed, need to raise 
capital in foreign and more developed markets such as the United States. However, an investor in the Unites 
States will expect the bank to comply with Basel standards. Otherwise, the investment will be considered 
riskier.  
71  For example, in Colombia, the banking industry encouraged financial regulators to consider the 
incorporation of hybrid instruments characteristics in order to be part of Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital 
adequacy category, even though these type of bonds do not exist in Colombian capital markets. Actually, 
Colombian banks wanting to issue AT1 (Additional Tier 1) bonds would must go to a more developed market 
such as the United States.  
72 Rating agencies were sharply criticised for their credit risk assessments of certain derivative products in 
the run-up to the global financial crisis and subsequently when certain European sovereign bonds were 
downgraded. However, rating agencies announcements continued to have significant effects on credit 
default swaps spreads after the global financial crisis. See Mahir Binici, Michael Hutchison and Evan 
Weicheng Miao, Are Credit Rating Agencies Discredited? Measuring Market Price Effects from Agency 
Sovereign Debt Announcements, BANK OF INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS WORKING PAPERS NO. 704 (2018) 
(available at: https://www.bis.org/publ/work704.pdf). 
73 Mathias Dewatripont and Jean Tirole, THE PRUDENTIAL REGULATION OF BANKS (MIT Press, 1994); Douglas 
W. Diamond and Raghuram G. Rajan, A Theory of Bank Capital, 55 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 2431 (2000); 
Douglas W. Diamond and Raghuram G. Rajan, Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation and Financial Fragility, 109 
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 287 (2001); Jochen Schanz, David Aikman, Paul Collazos, Marc Farag, 
David Gregory and Sujit Kapadia, The long-term economic impact of higher capital levels, BIS PAPER NO 60 
(http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap60j.pdf). 
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assessed the unintended consequences potentially created by this policy,74 especially in 
the context of emerging markets. First, financial regulators around the world may have 
different regulatory objectives, or at least different priorities among them. For instance, in 
emerging markets, financial inclusion can be as important as financial instability due to 
the economic and social problems that the lack of enough access to financial services 
may generate in these countries. Moreover, since many emerging economies do not 
even have a large banking sector, financial stability might not be a major concern for the 
global financial system due to the small systemic effects that a crisis in these countries 
may create. Second, divergences across jurisdictions and financial sectors may lead to 
different problems as shown during the 2008 Global financial crisis. For example, while 
the US financial crisis was originated by a combination of factors mainly related to the 
securitization of poor-quality loans, the Spanish banking crisis was due to a variety of 
local factors (e.g., housing bubble, poor corporate governance of Spanish saving banks, 
etc) intensified by the global financial crisis, and Colombia did not experience any major 
financial problems during the period of the global financial crisis. Therefore, the different 
problems and infrastructures existing across financial sectors may require different 
regulatory responses. Thus, the one-size-fits all solution promoted by the Basel 
Committee not only may create some costs of implementation, but it might not even be 
necessarily to address the particular issues existing in a country.  
 
Finally, it should be taken into account that, at least at a firm-level, equity is more 
expensive than debt due to several factors, including the tax subsidies of debt and  
asymmetries of information between firms and investors. Moreover, in many emerging 
economies, in which capital markets might not be deep enough to allow firms to raise 
capital, many companies might be forced to list their shares abroad. This could 
particularly the case of banks operating in emerging markets which might be forced to 
raise capital abroad in order to be able to comply with Basel capital requirements. 
Therefore, these foreign listings and issuances –sometimes just to comply with the Basel 
standards– will significantly increase transaction costs. And if so, banks may end up 
either (i) reducing their lending activity as means of reducing their risks, and therefore 
their needs for higher capital requirements to be able to comply with Basel standards; or 
                                                 
74 Some of these consequences have been warned by other authors. See Ahmed Al-Darwish, Michael 
Hafeman, Gregorio Impavido, Malcolm Kemp, and Padraic O’Malley, Possible Unintended Consequences of 
Basel III and Solvency II, IMF WORKING PAPER SERIES 11/187 (2011); Viral V. Acharya, The Dodd-Frank Act 
and Basel III: Intentions, Unintended Consequences, and Lessons for Emerging Markets, ASIAN 
DEVELOPMENT BANK INSTITUTE, ADBI WORKING PAPER 392 (2012). 
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(ii) increasing to their consumers the costs of their financial services. In both cases, 
these higher transactions will exacerbated the problem of financial exclusion already 
existing in many emerging economies.  
 
3.2. Different priorities of financial regulators 
 
The Basel Accord, like most financial regulation, reflected the priorities of its drafters. 
These included concerns about financial stability and the overall robustness of 
international capital markets, most of which, if not entirely, where in G-10 jurisdictions. 
From an economic perspective, financial regulation seeks to minimize information 
asymmetries, negative externalities, and other market frictions that may undermine the 
ability of the financial system to perform its functions.75 Since this type of frictions may 
differ across jurisdictions, the concrete legal goals of a financial regulator could differ. 
Therefore, along with the divergences that countries may have in terms of financial 
priorities, different problems and infrastructures may lead to different regulatory 
objectives.  
 
Indeed, financial regulation in a developed economy usually seeks to pursue a variety of 
similar goals, mainly associated with investor protection, the prevention of financial 
crime, and the promotion of competition, market efficiency, and financial stability. 76 
                                                 
75 For an analysis of the functions of the financial system, see Dwight B. Crane, Kenneth A. Froot, Andre F. 
Perold, Robert C. Merton, and Peter Tufano (eds.), THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: A FUNCTIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE (Harvard Business School Press, 1995); Ross Levine, Financial Development and Economic 
Growth: Views and Agenda (1997) 35 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE 688 (1997); John Armour et al, 
PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION (Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 24-27. 
76  For a general overview about the goals financial regulation, see John Armour et al, PRINCIPLES OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATION (Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 61-69. However, it should be noted that these 
goals might differ across jurisdictions not only because, as it is mentioned in this paper, different countries 
may have different problems and priorities, but also because of the divergences existing among financial 
supervisors across jurisdictions (e.g., twin peaks, institutional model, single financial supervisor). For 
example, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has the mission to protect investors, capital 
formation and fair, orderly and efficient markets (https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html). These goals 
do not include, for example, financial stability, since the institutional model followed in the United States 
assigns this goal to other regulatory agencies (e.g., Federal Reserve). Sometime similar happens with the 
U.K. Financial Conduct Authority, mainly designed to protect consumers, competition and market integrity 
(https://www.fca.org.uk/news/news-stories/fca%E2%80%99s-approach-advancing-its-objectives). In this 
case, however, the lack of references to financial stability is due to the fact that, in a ‘twin peaks’ model of 
supervision, protecting the financial system against systemic risks is goal pursued by another regulatory 
agency (in the context of the United Kingdom, for example, the Prudential Regulation Authority). In 
Singapore, the situation is a bit different. The Monetary Authority of Singapore is the single regulatory 
authority not only for monetary policy but also for financial regulation. For this reason, it has a broader set of 
objectives, including the promotion of variety of goals, including a stable financial system, safe and sound 
intermediaries, safe and efficient infrastructures, fair, efficient and transparent markets, transparent and fair-
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However, whereas most countries around the world can reasonably agree on the 
desirability of these goals, many economies might need to pursue other regulatory 
objectives (e.g., financial inclusion), or the weight of each goal may differ across 
jurisdictions. 
 
For example, some emerging economies may prioritize financial inclusion just as much 
as they do financial stability. In order to grow their economies in a sustained fashion, or 
to achieve financial security for unbanked or underbanked swaths of their domestic 
populations, they may choose ostensibly less onerous regulatory strategies to kick start 
and drive development. Moreover, since the type of financial institutions operating in 
many emerging economies might be relatively small, domestic, and with a simple 
business model, the concerns for financial stability and systemic risks cannot be as 
powerful, or at least as complex to address, as it can be the case of other countries or 
financial institutions. Therefore, the imposition of a financial regulation mainly focused on 
addressing systemic risk may exacerbate some local problems (e.g., financial exclusion) 
without creating any clear gains in terms of financial stability for some jurisdictions. As a 
result, Basel capital requirements should be sufficiently tailored to respond to the 
economic priorities of a particular system.  
 
3.2. Variety of problems and features across countries  
 
The types of problems and infrastructures existing in a country may also diverge 
significantly. For example, some countries exhibit more market-based financial systems 
(e.g., UK, US) while other jurisdictions may have larger banking systems (e.g., Germany, 
Spain).77 A country may have a developed capital market (e.g., US, UK) while that might 
not be true for many other economies (e.g., Ecuador, Colombia). Derivative markets can 
be very developed in many economies (e.g., UK, US) while derivatives in many 
countries might be even prohibited or strongly discouraged. 78  Banks in some 
jurisdictions may adopt the legal form of corporations while financial institutions in other 
                                                                                                                                                 
dealing intermediaries and offerors, and well-informed and empowered consumers. See Monetary Authority 
of Singapore, Objectives and Principles of Financial Supervision in Singapore (2015) (available at 
http://www.mas.gov.sg/~/media/MAS/News%20and%20Publications/Monographs%20and%20Information%
20Papers/Objectives%20and%20Principles%20of%20Financial%20Supervision%20in%20Singapore.pdf)  
77 Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale, COMPARING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS (MIT Press, 2001).   
78 This happens in some countries in the Middle East in which derivatives are associated with gambling, and 
therefore they are prohibited or strongly discouraged due to the religious reasons.  
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countries may take the form of cooperatives or some type of non-profit organizations.79 
Some countries may apply international reporting financial standards while other 
countries may follow local accounting rules. The banking system of a particular country 
can be formed by many small financial institutions while other banking sectors are 
mainly governed by a few major financial conglomerates.  
 
These divergences, among many others, may lead to different economic and financial 
problems and infrastructures that might require different regulatory responses. For 
example, in countries with a large banking sector, financial stability and systemic risk are 
probably considered major issues for financial regulators. Likewise, in countries with 
well-developed capital markets and many sophisticated investors and participants, the 
regulator can rely more on the market as a way to protect investors. By contrast, in 
countries in which the market is not able to accurately price the governance and 
performance of a firm, the regulator might need to be more paternalistic.  
 
The United States faced in 2008 one of the hardest financial crisis in the history mainly 
due to a housing bubble and the securitization of subprime mortgages.80 The same crisis  
did not impact Colombian economy or Colombian financial system stability.81 However, 
the country faced a major crisis in the 90’ due to a variety of macroeconomic factors.82 In 
Spain, the 2010 banking crisis, while affected by international factors (including the US 
financial crisis and the Eurozone crisis), was mainly due to a variety of internal 
problems83, including a housing bubble and the poor governance structure of Spanish 
                                                 
79 In the Spanish banking sector, for example, this type of non-profit organizations (adopting the form of 
‘foundations’) has traditionally played a major role. However, due to their corporate governance failures 
evidenced during the Spanish financial crisis, they were forced to disappear.  See Pablo Martín-Aceña, The 
Saving Banks Crisis in Spain: When and How? WORLD SAVINGS AND RETAIL BANKING INSTITUTE - EUROPEAN 
SAVINGS AND RETAIL BANKING GROUP, Working Paper (2013) (available at https://www.wsbi-
esbg.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/Martin-AcenaWeb.pdf)  
80 See Hal S. Scott and Anna Gelpern, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION 
(Foundation Press, 2012), pp. 35-44. Comparing the US financial crisis with those existing in Asia and 
Europe, see Ross P. Buckley, Emilios Avgouleas, Douglas W. Arner, Three Major Financial Crises: What 
Have We Learned, UNSW Law Research Paper No. 18-61 (2018) (available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3247455)  
81  Autorregulator del Mercado de Valores, Impacto de la crisis financiera internacional en el sistema 
financiero colombiano y en su regulación (2009) (available at 
https://www.amvcolombia.org.co/attachments/data/Impactodelacrisis.pdf). 
82 For an analysis of the Colombian financial crisis, see José D. Uribe and Hernando Vargas, Financial 
Reform, Crisis and Consolidation in Colombia, WORKING PAPERS BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA NO 204 (2002); Jose 
E. Gomez-Gonzalez and Nicholas M. Kiefer, Bank failure: Evidence from the Colombian financial crisis,  
OCC ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO 2 (2007). 
83 For an analysis of the reasons and costs of the Spanish banking crisis, see Javier Suárez, The Spanish 
Crisis: Background and Policy Challenges, CEPR DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES Nº 7909 (2010); Eloisa Ortega 
and Juan Peñalosa, The Spanish Economic Crisis: Key Factors and Growth Challenges in the Euro Area, 
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saving banks (Cajas de ahorros), which were not ‘corporations’ but ‘foundations’84 and 
were mainly managed by politicians.85  
 
The implementation of Basel capital requirements may also have different effects across 
jurisdictions. For example, in developing economies, the imposition of capital 
requirements may exacerbate the problems of financial exclusions often existing in these 
countries. In countries with underdeveloped capital markets, the costs associated with 
complying with Basel capital requirements can be higher due to the inability of a bank to 
raise capital in local markets. Therefore, the issuance of shares becomes more 
expensive due to higher transaction costs (e.g., hiring local and foreign lawyers). In 
China, it has been shown that the implementation of capital requirements leads to 
lending discrimination against small businesses. The reason behind this result seems to 
be that small businesses are typically the clients of small banks and these banks are 
more affected by new regulation86.  
 
Therefore, while several arguments (mainly associated with systemic risk and the 
globalization of financial services) justify a global approach to financial regulation, the 
particular features of a country should be taken into account since the problems and 
infrastructures may differ across jurisdictions. Hence, if financial regulators follow a ‘one 
size fits all’ approach, not only countries will be bearing some costs that may be 
undesirably harming their economies, but perhaps more importantly for financial 
regulation, these policies cannot be even protecting the stability of the financial system. 
 
3.3. The economic implications of higher capital requirements  
 
This section explains why equity is more expensive than debt, particularly in emerging 
markets. Namely, it shows, at a firm-level perspective, debt is cheaper than equity due to 
                                                                                                                                                 
DOCUMENTOS OCASIONALES DEL BANCO DE ESPAÑA, Nº 1201 (2012); Aurelio Gurrea Martínez, ¿Concurso o 
rescate de entidades financieras? Un análisis coste-beneficio del proceso de recapitalización de la banca 
española, in Andrés Recalde, Ignacio Tirado and Antonio Perdices (eds), CRISIS Y REFORMA DEL SISTEMA 
FINANCIERO (Aranzadi, 2015), pp. 329-347. 
84 Therefore, they were not subject to market scrutiny and a market for corporate control. 
85 More than 1/3 of the board members of Spanish saving banks were politicians representing the region 
where these institutions operated. See http://www.20minutos.es/noticia/558592/0/politicos/cajas/ahorro/  
86Li Ma, Miao Liu, Junxun Dai, and Xiang Huang, Capital Requirements of Commercial Banks and Lending 
Discrimination against Small Businesses: Theory and Empirical Evidence from China. ANNALS OF ECONOMICS 
AND FINANCE 14-2(A) (2013) (available at http://aeconf.com/articles/nov2013/aef140205.pdf) 
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a variety of factors, including the tax subsidies of debt, asymmetries of information, and 
the costs associated with raising capital – especially in many civil law countries in with 
these transaction requires shareholder approval, intervention of public notaries and other 
transactions costs. In emerging markets, rising capital equity becomes even more costly 
since, as the result of their underdeveloped capital markets, many firms seeking to raise 
capital (sometimes, because the law requires a minimum level of capital as it happens in 
the context of financial institutions) are required to list their shares oversee as means of 
being able to raise capital once they need it. Therefore, listing and issuing shares abroad 
increase transactions costs, making capital more costly.  
 
This argument is not different for banks. In fact, since banks can borrow money even 
cheaper –since a large part of a bank´s debt structures comes from deposits which are a 
source of finance almost free of charge for the bank– probably these differences 
between the cost of debt and the cost of equity become more pronounced. Hence, 
banks will be forced to have higher levels of equity in order to comply with Basel 
standards, and equity is more expense especially for banks operating in emerging 
markets that need to raise capital broad. This situation causes various adverse effects.  
 
First, banks can be incentivized to restrict lending. By reducing their lending practices, 
they will incur in less risky activity –and there is nothing riskless than not borrowing or 
investing at all– and if so they will be required to have lower levels of capital according to 
the Basel standards. Second, banks can be incentivized to preserve the volume of its 
lending activity but charging more for their loans. Thus, they will be able to recover the 
higher costs associated with the equity that they will be forced to have if they want to 
lend money. In either case, the economy will be harmed since individuals and firms will 
have lower access to finance.  
 
In the context of emerging markets, this harm will become greater due to the higher 
costs of raising capital and for the greater problems of financial exclusions existing in 
these countries. Therefore, while the imposition of new capital requirements for banks 
can create adverse effects for any economy, it will be more costly for banks from 
emerging markets. This argument, linked to the fact that, as it was discussed in the 
previous section, emerging markets may have different problems and financial priorities, 
and the implementation of Basel might not even be necessarily in the first place, will 
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make us argued that the implementation of Basel capital requirements can be socially 
undesirable in these countries.  
 
3.3.1. Why equity is more expensive than debt at a firm-level   
 
In a seminal work, Modigliani and Miller showed that, in a world with no asymmetries of 
information, no transaction costs, no taxes and no costs of bankruptcy, the value of the 
firm is independent of its capital structure.87 Therefore, it is irrelevant whether the firm´s 
assets are financed by debt or equity.  
 
Subsequent studies, however, showed that, once these ‘market frictions’ are included in 
the model, the use of debt can increase the value of the firm, or at least it will be 
preferred by the shareholders of a company (including banks) due to a variety of 
reasons. First, the use of debt may reduce agency costs between managers and 
shareholders in several ways. On the one hand, the use of debt will encourage 
managers to generate cash-flows as means of avoiding the risk of insolvency and 
therefore the risk of losing their jobs. Therefore, by generating more cash-flows, not only 
the managers can reduce agency problems but they can also maximize the value of the 
firm. On the other hand, the use of debt may encourage creditors to monitor debtor´s 
behaviour and investments projects. Therefore, it may improve the governance and 
performance of the firm. Finally, the existence of debt may reduce the amount of free 
cash flows that managers may waste when running the firm.88  
 
                                                 
87  Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and The Theory of 
Investment, 48 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 261 (1958). 
88 Michael C. Jensen, Agency Cost Of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AMERICAN 
ECONOMIC REVIEW 323 (1986). This waste of resources can be done in several ways, including tunnelling and 
‘empire buildings’ with the purpose of making a hostile takeover harder or just getting more power, popularity 
or private benefits of control. Analyzing how the threat of a hostile takeover generated by a market for 
corporate control may reduce agency costs, see the seminal work by Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the 
Market for Corporate Control, 73 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 110 (1965). See also Frank H. 
Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, THE PROPER ROLE OF A TARGET'S MANAGEMENT IN RESPONDING TO A TENDER 
OFFER, 94 Harvard Law Review 1161 (1981). For the reasons and costs of empire buildings, see William J. 
Baumol, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE, AND GROWTH (Macmillan, 1959); Robin Marris, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF 
“MANAGERIAL” CAPITALISM (MacMillan, 1964); Oliver Williamson, ECONOMICS OF DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOUR: 
MANAGERIAL OBJECTIVES IN A THEORY OF THE  FIRM (Kershaw Publishing, 1974); Michael C. Jensen, Agency 
Cost Of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 323 (1986); 
Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and The Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 
JOURNAL OF FINANCE 831 (1994). 
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Second, the use of debt may generate a positive signal to the market in a world of 
asymmetries of information. Indeed, according to the pecking order theory, 89 companies 
prefer to use debt over equity due to the asymmetries of information existing between 
insiders (i.e., managers and controlling shareholders) and outsiders (i.e., minority 
shareholders and creditors).90 If the insiders know that the company is not going to 
generate enough cash-flows to repay its debts, they would likely prefer to use equity 
over debt. Otherwise, if they decide to use debt and the company does not generate 
enough cash-flows to meet their payments, the company may become insolvent. And if 
so, managers may end up losing their jobs and the controlling shareholders may lose 
their investments. So the managers (sometimes encouraged by the controlling 
shareholders) will have incentives to prefer equity when they are not sure about the 
performance of the company and its future ability to generate cash-flows. By deciding to 
use debt, then, the market may perceive this choice as a positive signal, since the 
insiders seem to believe in the firm´s ability to generate cash-flows.  
 
Third, the use of debt can be less expensive because it is generally subsidized by the 
state through the tax system.91 Fourth, by using debt instead of equity, shareholders are 
able to externalize the costs of bankruptcy. Fifth, the use of debt does not require the 
costly procedure existing in many countries to increase capital.92 Moreover, in emerging 
economies, the issuance of shares may be even more costly, since firms might be 
forced to list their shares and raise capital oversee due the smaller size and depth of 
their local capital markets. Therefore, these companies will have to bear significant 
transactions costs (e.g., fees charge by local and international lawyers). 
 
Finally, for the specific context of banks, the use of debt can be even cheaper than for 
other firms, since part of a bank´s debt structure consists of deposits from the general 
public almost for free. Therefore, while obtaining equity can create several costs (e.g., 
                                                 
89 Stewart C.Myers and Nicholas S.Majluf, Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have 
information that investors do not have, 13 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 187 (1984). 
90Stewart C.Myers and Nicholas S.Majluf, Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have 
information that investors do not have, 13 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 187 (1984); Richard Brealey, 
Steward Myers, and Franklin Allen, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE (McGraw-Hill, 10th Edition, 2011), pp. 
460-462. 
91 Anat R. Admati, Peter M. DeMarzo, Martin F. Hellwig, and Paul C. Pfleiderer, Debt Overhang and Capital 
Regulation, ROCK CENTER FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AT STANFORD UNIVERSITY WORKING PAPER No. 114 
(2012) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2031204).  
92  This is particularly true in many civil law countries, where an increase of capital usually requires 
shareholder approval, and it also implies costs of public notaries, registries, taxes, and others.  
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issuance of shares), borrowing money from depositors can be an easy and cheap task 
for a bank. Hence, an all-equity bank will be a less valuable bank than one funded at 
least in part by deposits.93 
 
As a result of these factors, firms –including banks– will prefer debt over equity. 
Moreover, while many firms may have incentives to restrict the use of debt up to certain 
limits due to the risks and costs of bankruptcy,94 this deterrence effect might not be 
powerful enough in the context of financial institutions –particularly large banks. Indeed, 
in these entities, many managers might think that the government will not let the 
institution fail. Therefore, the costs of bankruptcy might not serve as a powerful device to 
constrain the use of debt.95  
 
For all of these reasons, it can be reasonably argued that, whereas it is not clear 
whether debt is cheaper than equity from a social welfare perspective,96 banks will find 
more costly to raise equity, especially in emerging economies. Therefore, by increasing 
capital requirements for banks, there will be two possible responses. First, banks may be 
incentivized to restrict lending as means of reducing their level of risk. If they manage to 
do so, they will be required to have lower levels of capital to comply with Basel 
standards. Second, banks can be incentivized to preserve the volume of its lending 
activity but charging more for their financial services. Thus, they will be able to recover 
the higher costs associated with increasing equity. In either case, the imposition of these 
higher capital requirements may harm firm´s access to finance in any economy, while it 
may exacerbate the problems of financial exclusions existing in emerging markets.  
                                                 
93 John Armour, Dan Awrey, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Colin Mayer, and Jennifer 
Payne  (2016), PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 312. 
94 See Jonathan Berk and Peter DeMarzo, CORPORATE FINANCE (Pearson International Edition, 2011), pp. 
520-522, explaining the so-called ‘trade-off theory’ and how it prevents firms from the excessive use of debt. 
95 For a different view, however, see John Armour and Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systematic Harm and Shareholder 
Value, 6 JOURNAL OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 35, 53 (2014).   
96 See Anat R. Admati, Peter M. DeMarzo, Martin F. Hellwig, and Paul Pfleidere, Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, 
and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Socially Expensive, PREPRINTS 
OF THE MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON COLLECTIVE GOODS BONN 2013/23 (2013), pp. 8-15; Anat R. 
Admati and Martin F. Hellwig THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT (Princeton University Press, 2013); Jochen Schanz, David Aikman, Paul Collazos, Marc Farag, 
David Gregory and Sujit Kapadia, The long-term economic impact of higher capital levels, BIS PAPER NO 60 
(http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap60j.pdf). A study conducted by the Bank for International Settlements 
about the long-term economic effects of stronger capital and liquidity requirements seems to reach the same 
conclusion. See http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs173.pdf. A similar result can be found in David Miles, Jing 
Yang, and Gilberto Marcheggiano, Optimal Bank Capital, BANK OF ENGLAND EXTERNAL MPC UNIT DISCUSSION 
PAPER NO 31 (2011).  These authors argue that the social benefit of higher capital for preventing and 
mitigating financial crises far exceeds its private costs to the banks, and suggested that optimum capital 
requirements may be double the Basel II ratio, at 14% risk-based capital and 6% leverage ratio.  
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3.3.2. Evidence 
 
3.3.2.1. Why higher capital requirements can be harmful for developed countries  
 
In the past years, many empirical studies have analyzed the impact of implementing new 
capital requirements in various countries around the world.97 For example, using data for 
the UK banks subject to time-varying capital requirements in 1998-2007, some authors 
show that one percentage point rise in capital requirements reduced credit growth in the 
United Kingdom by 6.5-7.2%.98 Likewise, other studies conducted in the United Kingdom 
showed that higher capital requirements provide an upper bound estimate of 4.5% 
reduction in lending associated with a one percentage point increase in risk-weighted 
capital requirement.99 
 
Assessing the transaction from Basel I to Basel II in France, another empirical study 
showed that a 2% reduction in capital requirements led to an increase in aggregate 
corporate lending of 1.5%. 100 In Italy, it was found a 2% contraction in credit supply 
when banks became more capitalized after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Finally, 
using data for 250 large banks in the euro area, other authors found that forcing a 
banking group to increase its Core Tier 1 ratio by one percentage point was associated 
with a reduction in this group’s credit growth by 1.2%.101  
 
In the United States, the empirical evidence also shows some interesting results for the 
assessment of the economic implication of increasing banks’ capital requirements.  
Though most of these studies do not show the impact of higher capital requirements on 
the volume or cost of credit, they show a correlation between higher capital requirements 
                                                 
97 For a summary of the existing empirical literature on this matter, see Natalya Martynova, Effect of Bank 
Capital Requirements on Economic Growth: A Survey, DNB WORKING PAPER No 467 (2015). 
98 Shekhar Aiyar, Charles Calomiris and Tomasz Wiedalek, Does macropru leak? Evidence from a UK policy 
experiment, 46 JOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING 181 (2014). 
99 Joseph Noss and Priscilla Toffano, Estimating the impact of changes in bank capital requirements during 
a credit boom, BANK OF ENGLAND WORKING PAPER NO. 494 (2014). 
100 Matthieu Brun, Henri Fraisse and David Thesmar, The real effects of bank capital requirements, DÉBATS 
ÉCONOMIQUES ET FINANCIERS NO.8, BANQUE DE FRANCE (2013). 
101 Jean-Stephane Mesonnier and Allen Monks, Did the EBA capital exercise cause a credit 
crunch in Euro area?, BANQUE DE FRANCE WORKING PAPER NO. 491 (2014) 
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and an increase in the size of the shadow banking system.102 The reason seems to be 
quite straightforward: shadow banks take advantages of the regulatory arbitrage 
generated by the imposition of higher capital requirements to traditional banks. 
Therefore, while higher capital requirements for banks may enhance the stability of the 
financial system, this side effect of increasing banks’ capital requirements makes the 
overall financial system riskier.  
 
3.3.2.1. Why higher capital requirements can be even more harmful for emerging 
markets 
 
In an empirical study of the Colombian banking system, one of the authors of this paper 
tests whether additional capital requirements –as the ones recommended by Basel III– 
make loans more expensive and also affect the expansion of lending in Colombia.103 
Unlike previous studies conducted in emerging economies, this paper does not provide 
any robust evidence regarding the impact of increasing capital requirements in the 
supply of loans. Nevertheless, it shows that these higher requirements in Tier 1 capital –
core equity capital specifically– make loans more expensive in Colombia. Therefore, the 
implementation of Basel capital requirements actually reduced people´s access to 
finance in Colombia.  
 
This effect becomes particularly worrying in Colombia because, as other emerging 
economies, the country faces significant financing necessities. Moreover, the lack of 
developed capital markets and other alternatives sources of finance not only make 
harder to promote financial inclusion and economic growth, but it encourages some 
                                                 
102 Guillaume Plantin, Shadow Banking and Bank Capital Regulation, 28 THE REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES 
146 (2015); Viral V. Acharya, Philipp Schnabl, and Gustavo Suarez, Securitization without risk transfer, 107 
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 515 (2013); Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick, Regulating the shadow 
banking system, 41 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 261 (2010); Zoltan Pozsar, Tobias Adrian, 
Adam Ashcraft, and Hayley Boesky, Shadow banking, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORT 
NO. 458 (2010); Joshua Gallin, Shadow Banking and the Funding of the Nonfinancial Sector, FINANCE AND 
ECONOMICS DISCUSSION SERIES, DIVISIONS OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS AND MONETARY AFFAIRS, FEDERAL 
RESERVE BOARD (2013); Juliane Begenau, Saki Bigio, and Jeremy Majerovitz, What can we learn from the 
financial flows of the 2008-2009 crisis, TECH. REP., WORKING PAPER (2016). 
103 See Nydia Remolina-León, Do New Capital Requirements Make Loans More Expensive? An Empirical 
Study for the Colombian Banking System, IBERO-AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND FINANCE, WORKING PAPER 
SERIES 11/2016 (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2861607)  
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opportunistic and even criminal forms of lending such as the so-called ‘shark loans’, 
particularly common in the country.104  
 
Another emerging economy negatively affected by the implementation of capital 
requirements is China, where imposing higher levels of equity resulted in lending 
discrimination against small businesses. 105  Moreover, it was found that the 
implementation of capital requirements had a significant impact on China’s banking 
industry. Namely, it made banks reluctant to take risks (even tolerable risks) what it can 
be particularly harmful for financing innovation and growth.  
 
Therefore, even though the evidence suggests that the implementation of Basel capital 
requirements may have adverse effects for developed economies, it seems particularly 
harmful in developing markets, not only for the result shown by the empirical studies 
from China and Colombia, but also for their greater problems of financial exclusion.  
 
3.3.3. Implications 
 
We have shown that increasing higher capital requirements for banks may harm access 
individuals´ and firms´ access to a variety of financial services, including credit, deposits, 
payments, insurance and other risk managements. 106  Thus, various costs can be 
created, especially in the context of emerging markets. First, as shown by the law and 
finance literature, financial development is usually associated with economic growth.107 
                                                 
104 Era Dabla-Norris, Yixi Deng, Anna Ivanova, Izabela Karpowicz, Filiz Unsal, Eva VanLeemput, and Joyce 
Wong, Financial Inclusion: Zooming in on Latin America, IMF WORKING PAPER 15/206 (2015). 
105 Li Ma, Miao Liu, and Junxun Dai and Xiang Huang, Capital Capital Requirements of Commercial Banks 
and Lending Discrimination against Small Businesses: Theory and Empirical Evidence from China. ANNALS 
OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 14-2(A) (2013) (available at http://aeconf.com/articles/nov2013/aef140205.pdf) 
106 Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Throsten Beck, and Patrick Honohan, Finance for All? Policies and Pitfalls in 
Expanding Access, WORLD BANK POLICY REPORT (2008).  
107  Ross Levine, Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and agenda, 35 JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMIC LITERATURE 688 (1997); Stijn Claessens and Konstantinos Tzioumis,  Ownership and Financing 
Structures of Listed and Large Non-listed Corporations 14 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL 
REVIEW 266 (2006); Ross Levine, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth, JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL 
INTERMEDIATION 8 (1999); Thorsten BeckAsli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine, Finance, Inequality and the 
Poor, 12 JOURNAL  OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 27 (2007); Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de Silanes, Andrei 
Shleifer and Robert Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 53 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 1131 (1997); 
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, Law and finance, 106 
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This is the result of the ability of the financial system to channel funds from savers to 
borrowers, facilitate exchanges through the payment system, select value-creating 
projects, improve debtors’ and firms’ behaviour and performance, and facilitate risk 
management.108 Therefore, a decrease in the financial services activity can be harmful 
for the real economy.  
 
Second, the lack of use of financial services may increase a country’s hidden economy. 
For instance, if individuals and firms do not use electronic payment systems and most of 
their transactions are paid in cash, it will be easier to avoid taxes and governmental 
control. And this problem can become particularly harmful for many emerging (even 
developed) economies already suffering from this problem.  
 
Third, higher regulatory costs in the banking system may create regulatory arbitrage.109 
Therefore, not only it may be in unfair in the sense that entities providing similar services 
might not be enjoying the same level playing field, but it can also increase the size of the 
shadow banking system.110  
 
Fourth, people´s inability to have access to financial services through the banking 
system may be incentivised to use some forms of ‘shark loans’ as a way to finance their 
consumption. And this illegal lending practices –primarily existing in emerging 
economies111– not only can be harmful from an economic perspective but they can also 
create several problems of security. For this reason, it seems particularly relevant to 
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analyze the direct and indirect effects generated by the imposition of new capital 
requirements, especially in emerging markets.   
 
3.4. Conclusion  
 
This section has shown that different countries may exhibit different problems, 
infrastructures and financial priorities that may justify different regulatory responses. 
Therefore, the ‘one size fits all’ model of regulation incentivized by the Basel Committee 
may create several problems without necessarily improving the robustness of a 
particular financial system. In our opinion, the presence and power of certain countries in 
the Basel Committee makes Basel standards a bit biased toward those problems and 
financial priorities existing in their economies. Therefore, while several arguments 
(mainly associated with systemic risk and the globalization of financial services) justify a 
global approach to financial regulation, the particular features of a country should be 
taken into account. Otherwise, not only countries will be bearing some costs that may 
undesirably harm their economies, but perhaps more importantly for financial regulation, 
these policies cannot be even protecting the stability of the financial system. 
 
4. Proposals  
 
4.1. Tax system 
 
A simple change in the tax system may favor the capitalization of banks in a more 
efficient way than the costly rules imposed by the Basel Committee. Namely, we 
propose that the Basel Committee expand its supervisory mandate to explore tax 
strategies in concert with the OECD wherein companies may deduct an implied interest 
of equity.112 Likewise, member countries should consider independently implementing 
tax strategies wherein the tax benefits of debt are abolished for financial institutions.113 
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Thus, banks would have more incentives to increase capital from two different ways: by 
punishing debt and by favouring equity through the tax system.  
 
In our opinion, while some may argue that the unfavourable treatment of debt may lead 
to an increase in the cost of credit, we do not think this result will occur for two primary 
reasons. First, our proposal would simultaneously include softening (even abandoning) 
the regulatory costs in terms of capital requirements directly or indirectly imposed by the 
Basel Committee. Therefore, the potential increase in the cost of debt generated by 
abolishing the tax benefits of debt would be offset for this reduction of regulatory costs. 
Second, by giving tax benefits to equity, this source of finance would become cheaper. 
Therefore, this proposal would incentivize banks to have higher capital requirements 
without pushing countries to change their financial priorities, harm their economies or 
suffer other unintended consequences generated by the implementation of Basel 
standards.  
 
4.2. Regional Committees for the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
 
The particular features and problems of each financial system seem to require a more 
tailored regulation. Therefore, even though various factors (including financial stability 
and the globalization of finance) require a global approach to financial regulation, a local 
or at least regional focus seems to be needed in the Basel Committee. In that way 
countries can inform the rulemaking process in ways that help alert rule-writers as to the 
distributive impact of the rules, and costs for local economies, that certain reforms may 
entail.  For that purpose, we think that the Basel Committee’s regional meetings should 
have greater say in the production of rules that impact their domestic financial system.   
 
Currently, regional forums are just that, forums, and most developing countries have no 
say in the formulation of international capital standards.  We propose that a mechanism 
of review be launched, along with expanded participation in activities setting the 
objectives of new rounds of policymaking.  At present, the only recourse for countries 
disinterested in Basel rules that they have adopted under domestic law is 
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undercompliance in the form of regulatory forbearance.  This, however, leads to 
incentives to underimplement even helpful rules necessary for growing a domestic 
financial system. It can also help promote cultures of noncompliance among domestic 
supervisors and an undermining of the rule of law.  A better strategy is to have more 
countries directly participating in the reforms, early on.  This can increase the fairness of 
international standards, while also heightening their compliance pull. 
 
4.3. Further Steps to Avoid a One-Size-Fits-All Assessment of Financial Systems 
and Institutions  
 
Even when the recommendations of the Basel Committee are not directly applicable to 
many countries and institutions, this paper has showed how a variety of factors 
(including market forces and the role of international organizations) might create 
considerable pressures to conform with Basel capital requirements, regardless of their 
relevance for a country’s developmental and legal status.  
 
Many of these pressures are related to the role and power of the market.  Market 
participants may choose to punish firms operating in jurisdictions that do not comply with 
Basel standards.  Noncompliance may be viewed, as mentioned above, as a signal of 
risk. In some instances, however, such stances may prove unwarranted, and even 
unhelpful, but with no alternative sources of information they may be left with no choice.  
 
An optimal system would allow investors, lenders, and other financial intermediaries that 
are stakeholders in Basel compliance to make their decisions based on the particular 
features of a country.  Countries and governments can help.  But it may be worth also 
including the Basel Committee and the IMF as well, allowing countries subject to 
surveillance to state their own case in official international assessments to provide color 
to official international monitoring.   
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper has argued that the implementation of Basel capital requirements may create 
some unintended consequences. On one hand, higher capital requirements may reduce 
people´s access to finance, and this effect can be particularly harmful in emerging 
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markets taking into account their less developed capital markets and their greater 
problems of financial exclusion. On the other hand, Basel standards do not take into 
account the particular features of a country, despite the fact that, forced by the market 
and many international organizations, most countries around the world end up adopting 
these practices. Therefore, the ‘one size fits all’ model of regulation incentivized by the 
Basel Committee may create several problems without necessarily improving the 
robustness of a particular financial system. 
 
We have suggested various policy recommendations to promote a more resilient 
financial system without hampering financial inclusion and economic growth. First, we 
have proposed to use the tax system to incentivize the capitalization of banks. Second, 
we have also argued that regional committees should play a major role in the Basel 
Committee. Thus, it will be easier to understand the particular needs and problems of a 
country or region before implementing policies that may end up affecting the global 
economy. Finally, we also urge investors, lenders, credit rating agencies and other 
financial intermediaries to pay more attention to the specific features of a country. By 
abandoning the one-size-fits-all approach that seems to prevail in financial regulation, 
not only investors will enjoy a greater level of protection but, more importantly, countries 
will be in a better position to address their local problems and priorities without harming, 
but rather enhancing, the stability of the global financial system.  
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